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NOTES

Agreement in Principle:
A
Compromise
for
Activist
Shareholders
from
the
UK
Stewardship Code
ABSTRACT

Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now
highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors,
which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate
governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as
mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value
based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the
expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on
business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional
investors are "rationallyreticent," meaning that they are willing
to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them.
Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to
address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries and,
ultimately, spur the effective monitoring of corporate boards.
Activist shareholders, such as hedge funds, often achieve their
business strategy and governance objectives by obtaining
toehold positions in a corporation and soliciting support from
institutional investors for their governance proposals. However,
this solution is in jeopardy. Recently proposed regulatory
changes in the United States track adopted legislation in the
United Kingdom and Europe, and pose a threat to domestic
activist shareholder success.
This
Note
argues that
incorporationof the UK Stewardship Code's Principle 5 into the
U.S. regulatory scheme may help alleviate the potentially
chilling effects of the proposed rule-making on shareholder
activists.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Institutional investors in the United States and the United
Kingdom now hold more than 70 percent of the outstanding equity
issued by each respective nation's largest public firms.' The agency
problems posed by the classical Berle-Means theory of dispersed
share ownership are today a moot point. 2 With the vast majority of

1.
See MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHEN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE
2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION 27 (2010) (showing institutional ownership concentration statistics);
INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST. & INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS.,
CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR'S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE
AND RISK REVIEW 9-10 (2012), available at http://irrcinstitute.org/pdflFINAL-ControlledCompany-ISS-Report.pdf [http://perma.cYW76-X989] (archived Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter
IRRC Report] (showing the growth and frequency of public firms in the United States);
see, e.g., Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional
Investors, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 406 (July/August 2010)
[hereinafter Wong, Stewardship] (reflecting data for the United Kingdom).
2.
See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a
Myth?, 83 Bus. HIST. REV. 443, 467 (2009); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse
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equity interests held by intermediary institutions, like mutual funds
and pension funds, individual investors now find themselves
grappling with two sets of unwieldy agency relationships: (1) between
themselves and corporate directors and (2) between themselves and
intermediary institutions.3 The result has been further displacement
of ownership from control and further devaluation of governance
rights.4
Beginning in the early 1990s, many commentators argued that
institutional investors ought to bridge this widening gap by
"monitoring" and "engaging" portfolio companies on behalf of their
beneficial owners and the public generally. 5 In response to the global
financial crisis in 2008-2009, some jurisdictions, including both the
United Kingdom 6 and the European Union, 7 agitated for best practice
codes 8 urging governance obligations of "stewardship" and
"sustainable shareholder engagement" upon institutional investors.9
The push for these governance obligations stemmed from a belief that

Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1384 (2009) (providing
evidence suggesting that ownership patterns no longer reflect the Berle and Means
theory).
3.
Cf. BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, ARE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION?: KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND
PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS' ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY

MARKETS 21-24 (2011), available at http J/www.ced.org/pdflAre-Institutional-InvestorsPart-of-the-Problem-or-Part-of-the-Solution.pdf [http://perma.cc/5A9X-KKGT] (highlighting
a mismatch between the goals of individual investors and the acts of institutions);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism:Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of GovernanceRights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 (May
2013) (illustrating a dual set of agency relationships).
4.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3 (explaining how governance rights are
devalued).
5.
See, e.g., Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik, & David Pitt-Watson, Active
Shareowner Stewardship: A New Paradigm for Capitalism, 2 ROTMAN INT'L J. OF
PENSION MGMT. 10 (Fall 2009) (calling for a monitoring structure for portfolio
companies).
6.

See JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM

DECISION MAKING 44 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015) [httpsJ/perma.c/Y89P-9Y4X] (archived Feb. 22, 2015) (urging
the UK to adopt a best practice code and stressing its importance).
7.
See Resolution on a Corporate Governance Framework for European
Companies, EUR. PARL. RES. (A7-0051/2012) 11 25, 34, 2012 O.J. (C 161) (adopting text
P7TA(2012)0118).
8.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committed of the
Regions, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance-A Modern
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, at 8,
COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012) (emphasizing the importance of best practice
codes).
9.

See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE,

1

4, at 1 (2012)

[hereinafter STEWARDSHIP CODE], available at https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/
e2dbO42e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6 [https://perma.cc/VB6A-G5TG] (archived Jan.
31, 2015) (describing stewardship and shareholder engagement).
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institutional investor stewardship will foster the long term success of
companies "in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also
prosper."10
Institutional intermediaries, however, have proven to be
ineffective as proactive corporate monitors because they lack the
incentive and expertise for corporate stewardship." As a result, the
immense governance rights possessed by institutional owners have
become significantly undervalued. 12
Just because institutional investors are unwilling to actively
engage corporate boards and propose changes in governance does not
mean that they are unwilling to respond to such proposals. 1
Empirical evidence indicates that mutual funds often act on proposals
presented to them, and oppose management, on core governance
issues. 14 The theory underlying this behavior is known as rational
reticence. While mutual funds are reluctant to proactively engage
portfolio companies, mutual funds are not passive when faced with
the opportunity to respond to proposals.15
In the United States, it has been argued that activist
shareholders, such as activist hedge funds, are the capital market's
evolutionary response to the agency gap that results from ownership
concentration in institutional intermediaries.1 6 Activist shareholders
typically acquire noncontrolling toehold positions in corporations and
then subsequently attempt to influence those corporations' business
strategies. 17 Within this framework, activist shareholders play a

10.
Id. 1 1, at 1.
11.
See Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1 (stating efforts to get institutional
investors to act as stewards have failed); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 595-608 (1990) (providing examples of the
ways in which money manager incentives and conflicts of interest effect voting and
activism); Marc Goergen, Luc Renneboog & Chendi Zhang, Do UK Institutional
Shareholders Monitor Their Investee Firms?, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 39 (2008) (stating
there is empirical evidence to suggest institutional investors do not perform any
monitoring).
12.
See Gilson & Gordon, supranote 3 (detailing how the lack of incentives and
capacity leads to the devaluation of governance rights).
13.
See id. at 867 (asserting that institutional shareholders are likely to
respond to proposals).
14.
See Sean S. Collins, Inv. Co. Inst., Trends in Proxy Voting by Registered
Investment Companies 2007-2009, 16 PERSPECTIVE, Nov. 2010, at 1, 4, fig. 1, available
at http://www.ici.org/pdf/perl6-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PNR-Q9JK] (archived Jan. 31,
2015).

15.
See Gilson & Gordon, supranote 3, at 867 (defining rational reticence).
16.
See, e.g., id. (arguing that activist hedge funds offer a response to the
shortfall in monitoring of institutional intermediaries); Alon Bray, Wei Jiang, Frank
Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (noting that hedge funds target institutional
intermediaries because it is easier to acquire a significant stake more quickly).
17.
See Toehold PurchaseDefinition, INVESrOPEDIA.COM, http/www.investopedia.com/
terms/t/toeholdpurchase.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2015) [http://perma.cc/775X-8W63]
(archived Jan. 30, 2015) (defining and explaining the rules behind a "Toehold
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specialized corporate monitoring role, breathing life into the
substantial governance rights that lay dormant in the hands of
institutional investors.1 8 Activists derive the support they need for
successful proposals by convincing institutional owners that their
plan will enhance shareholder value. 19 In this way, activist
shareholders bring about a form of "market-based stewardship." 20
Assuming that activists are integral to market-based
stewardship in the United States, the current debate over the terms
of the stock accumulation disclosure requirement under the Williams
Act 21 threatens to negatively impact the incentives of would-be
governance activists. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has recently indicated possible regulatory changes that are in line
with changes that have been enacted in the UK Stewardship Code
and the European Union. These changes would lower the threshold
for activist reporting, shorten the disclosure window, and broaden the
scope of derivatives that must be disclosed. 22
Although institutional owner rational reticence makes the UK
Stewardship Code overall a poor fit for the United States, the Code's
Principle 5 offers a compromise to activist shareholders. Principle 5
suggests that UK institutional investors should be willing to act
collectively with other investors as well as disclose policies on
collective engagement. 23 If U.S. institutional owners develop and
Purchase"); see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 904 (describing the effects of
toeholds on activists).
18.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 867 (framing the role of activist
shareholders). This approach stands in contrast to the raider-like takeover attempts of
the 1980s.
19.
See id. (detailing ways in which activists gain power). Indeed, institutions
are becoming increasingly willing to jump on board with activist proposals. See, e.g.,
Martin Lipton, Current Thoughts About Activism, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Aug. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), httpJlblogs.law
.harvard.edulcorpgov/2013/08/09/current-thoughts-about-activism/ [http://perma.ccIY5SG-B4F6]
(archived Jan. 30, 2015) (acknowledging that institutional portfolio managers are
increasingly supporting activist investor proposals, while attempting to characterize
this dynamic as a product of short-termism).
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 867 (describing how activists can
20.
perform a stewardship function).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (outlining the stock accumulation disclosure
21.
requirement).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
22.
No. 111-203, § 929R(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1866 (2010) (inserting "or within a shorter
time as the Commission may establish by rule"); Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue (Dec.
15, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spchl21511mls.htm [http://
perma.cc/K4XG-T7YR] (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (emphasizing the importance of
increased disclosures and quality communication); Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FS7WDKM] (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (arguing for a shortened reporting window).
23.
See STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, at 8-9 (laying out guidance on
Principle 5).
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disclose their policies for collective action, activist shareholders will
have a significantly clearer idea of how successful they will be in
gaining institutional owner support for their proposals at the outset,
which may help alleviate the new challenges posed by a shorter
disclosure window or broader derivative disclosure requirement. In
turn, activist investors will continue to serve their role as governance
intermediaries and corporate monitors.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the historical
development, policies, and Principles of the UK Stewardship Code. It
then frames the effectiveness of the Code and its underlying policies
within the context of institutional investor rational reticence. Further
discussion describes the evolution of U.S. capital markets and the role
activist investors have come to play as governance intermediaries.
Following this discussion, this Note briefly addresses the current
domestic debate involving regulatory changes that would emulate
those enacted in the United Kingdom and Europe.
Part III analyzes the incompatibility of the UK Stewardship
Code as a whole with U.S. equity markets. Part III then discusses
how activist shareholders serve as governance intermediaries and
give voice to institutional investor governance rights. After this
discussion, Part III analyzes current regulatory proposals under
consideration by the Securities and Exchange Commission, their
similarities to European regimes, and the chilling effects they may
have on the role of activist shareholders.
Part IV begins by discussing the way Principle 5 of the UK
Stewardship Code already aligns with current U.S. equity ownership
patterns. This Note concludes that Principle 5 offers a potential
compromise to both activist shareholders and those arguing for
regulatory reform in the United States similar to that in the United
Kingdom. This Note recommends that the United States adopt
Principle 5 of the Stewardship Code in conjunction with shortening
the ten-day disclosure window. By requiring institutional investors to
maintain and disclose a collective action policy, activist investors will
have the opportunity to gain a clear sense of the support they are
likely to receive from institutional intermediaries when pursuing
certain governance actions. As a result, the broadened derivative
disclosure requirements will be less likely to stymie the role activist
shareholders play in monitoring corporate boards and leveraging
governance rights. By adopting Principle 5, the United States would
incorporate a helpful aspect of the UK Stewardship Code, and
continue to foster efficiency in evolving U.S. capital markets.
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II. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS IN UK AND U.S.
CAPITAL MARKETS

The increasing concentration of equity ownership in the hands of
institutional investors has been accompanied by a corresponding
debate regarding the role that institutional investors should assume
in monitoring portfolio companies. 2 4 As the agency gap between
individual investors and company leadership widens, many argue
that the institutions responsible for the widening should bridge the
gap.2 5 At first blush, this seems a reasonable solution given the size
and sophistication of institutional investors and their proximity and
access to the companies in which they invest. 26 On the other hand,
many commentators express concern that institutional investors may
be ill-suited to assume such a role in view of their predominantly
short-term business models.27
In truth, much of the debate today is dependent on one's
conception of the role of corporations in society more generally. 28 If
one tends to think of a corporation as a living, breathing social
organism, it follows that institutional stewardship is necessary to
protect society as a whole. 29 If, on the other hand, one views
corporations as more of a contractual nexus instituted for the
transacting of business, the logical conclusion is that institutional
stewardship of corporations is not a necessity because an efficient

24.
See Konstantinos Sergakis, The UK Stewardship Code: Bridging the Gap
Between Companies and Institutional Investors, 47 R.J.T. n.s. 109, 118 (2013)
(discussing debate and controversial conclusions).
25.
See id. at 119 (noting that the UK Stewardship Code attempts to bridge the
gap by increasing the activism of institutional investors).
26.
See, e.g., SIR ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 6.13, at 50 (1992) [hereinafter
CADBURY REPORT], available at http://ecgi.orglcodes/documents/cadbury.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4255-GB86] (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (arguing that institutions are able to interface with
the boards of companies in which they have invested).
27.
See John C. Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As
CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (1991) (asserting that monitoring by
financial institutions could be limited to only improving their own positions rather
than that of the shareholders); see also HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 21-22
(pointing out the mismatch between the goals of individual investors and the acts of
institutions); discussion infra Part II.B (discussing rational reticence).
28.
Compare Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3 (arguing for reducing costs), with
Adam 0. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Eric S. Robinson & William Savitt, Fair
Markets and FairDisclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 136
(2013) (arguing for fair markets).
29.
See, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, InstitutionalShareholders as Stewards: Toward a
New Conception of Corporate Governance, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 387, 388
(2012) (positing that stewardship serves all of society and not just stakeholders).
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market will evolve and produce a solution.3 0 This Note does not
purport to advance the correctness of either of these views but
proceeds under the supposition that the latter is more representative
of current U.S. equity market realities. 3 1
Because this Note rejects domestic adoption of a code such as the
UK Stewardship Code generally but recommends incorporation of a
discrete part of the Code into the U.S. regulatory regime, it is
important to first understand the origins of the Code and the
economic theory on which its Principles are based.
A. The UK Stewardship Code
1.

Historical Background

The Code is a recent creation of the UK's Financial Reporting
Council (FRC), but is the product of two decades of momentum. 32 In
1992, the Cadbury Report concluded that institutional shareholders
were better situated than individual investors to monitor portfolio
companies and that it was therefore important for a regulatory
system to encourage institutional shareholders to engage with
corporate boards. 33 The Cadbury Report further encouraged
institutional investors to make full use of their voting rights and to
disclose their policies for doing so. 34 In 1998, the Hampel Report
reiterated, and built upon, the suggestions urged by the Cadbury
Report. 3 5 The Hampel Report clearly affirmed the UK's view of
corporations as societal organisms. 36 The conclusions and
recommendations of these two reports provided the foundation and
starting point for most subsequent reports on institutional investor
engagement and even for the current Stewardship Code.37

30.
See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, 866-69 (arguing that activist
shareholders perform institutional stewardship).
31.
See generally id. (finding that activist shareholders are evolving to produce
a solution).
32.
See Sergakis, supra note 24, at 121 (providing historical background).
33.
See CADBURY REPORT, supra note 26, T 6.11(1), at 49 ("Institutional
investors should encourage regular, systematic contact at senior executive level [sic] to
exchange views and information on strategy, performance, board membership and
quality of management.").
34.
See id. ¶ 6.12, at 50 (urging members to use their voting rights and disclose
their policies).
35.

HAMPEL COMMITTEE, HAMPEL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,

FINAL REPORT, ¶ 2.13(I), at 19-20 (1998) [hereinafter HAMPEL REPORT], available at
http://ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf [http://perma.cclL2TX-UU5Q] (archived Jan.
31, 2015) (suggesting that institutional shareholders make considered use of their
votes).

36.
See id. ¶ 1.1, at 7 (arguing for accountable organizations).
37.
See generally Sergakis, supra note 24, at 10 (describing the current
Stewardship Code).
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The ideals of institutional investor engagement continued to gain
momentum in the United Kingdom in the early 2000s with the
releases of the Myners Report,3 8 the Higgs Report, 39 and guidance
from the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC). 40 Meanwhile,
the ISC urged institutional investors to engage in active and
consistent dialogue with their portfolio companies' directors,
intervening when necessary, all the while disclosing institutional
engagement policies and results.4 ' The overall response to the early
guidelines contained in Myners, Higgs, and the ISC documents was
positive. 4 2 Therefore, there was little reason to doubt the effectiveness
or practicality of the guidelines, at least while the global economy
seemed to be flourishing. 4 3
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, debate
came roaring back. 44 UK regulatory authorities accused institutional
investors of apathetic monitoring, commonly referring to institutional
investors as being "asleep." " The House of Commons Treasury
Committee encapsulated this sentiment, pronouncing, "[I]nvestors
have failed in one of their core tasks, namely the effective scrutiny
and monitoring the [sic] decisions of boards and executive

38.

See generally PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED

KINGDOM: A REVIEW (2001), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/2F9/02/31.pdf
[http://perna.cc/89VVN6NP] (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (proposing more active engagement by institutional
shareholders).
39.

See generally DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF

NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 69-70 (2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/higgsreport.pdf [http://perma.ccEF8D-56ZK (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (theorizing
that investors could help ensure non-executive directors have an effective role on
boards by questioning them on corporate governance matters).
40.
See generally INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDERS' COMM., THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND AGENTS - STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2009)

(outlining the responsibilities of institutional shareholders).
41.
See id. (noting the ISC push to get institutional investors to increase active
engagement).
42.
See, e.g., Bonnie Hampel, Forward to HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 35,
para. 4, at 6 (stating that the recommendations had been broadly welcomed by both
companies and investors).
43.

See INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: THE GLOBAL

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION ch. I, at 1 (2004) (establishing the growth of the global
economy); UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION & PROSPECTS 1 (2004)

(stating there was an expectation of continued growth in the global economy).
44.
See Sergakis, supra note 24, at 122.
45.
E.g., Jennifer Hughes, FSA Chief Lambasts Uncritical Investors, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 11:31 PM), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/9edc7548-Oe8d-lldeb099-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3SXZUf4SH [http://perma.cc/T8DD-R3PG] (archived Feb.
22, 2015) (quoting the chief executive of the Financial Services Authority accusing
institutional shareholders of not adequately monitoring).
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management in the banking sector. . . ."46 Many commentators went
as far as to say that institutional investors were part of the problem,
not only by failing to intervene but also by actively pushing company
management for short-term returns at the expense of heightened risk
and exposure. 4 7
In the Walker Review, Sir David Walker took the former
stance. 48 Walker concluded that, while not a key cause of the
financial crisis, institutional investor apathy and "acquiescence" in
risky management decisions likely exacerbated the extent of the
financial crisis.49 While acknowledging that such behavior on the part
of institutional investors was not "irrational," Walker went on to
conclude that many of the root causes of the UK Banking Crisis could
have been at least mitigated by heightened scrutiny and engagement
by institutions.8 0 The Walker Review, along with a revised ISC Code,
both issued in 2009, formed the springboard for the Stewardship
Code. 5
In July 2010, the FRC issued the Stewardship Code in an effort
to spur genuine active engagement by institutions through greater
transparency and disclosure. 52 The Stewardship Code initially
received mixed reviews-while some believed the Stewardship Code
should have recommended even higher standards, others saw it as
the potential first step in a corporate governance paradigm shift.5 3
The initial version of the Code also lacked clarity as to its scope: it
was ambiguous as to exactly which institutional investors were
covered and precisely what was necessitated by its "comply or

46.

HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PAY IN THE CITY (NINTH REPORT OF SESSION), 2008-9,

H.C. 519, at 64 (U.K.).
47.
E.g., Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia & Marc Lipson, Institutional Ownership
and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 444
(2010) (arguing institutions can be influenced by investor reactions and focus on shortterm performance); see Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1 (explaining why it is difficult
for institutional investors to act as stewards).
AND

48.
SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ¶¶ 5.10-11

(Nov. 2009) [hereinafter WALKER REVIEW], available at http//webarchive.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walkerreview_261109.pdf [httpJ/
perma.cc/N69D-H8DL] (archived Feb. 24, 2015).
Id. T 5.10.
49.
50.
Id. 15.11.
51.
Sergakis, supra note 24, at 122 (noting that the ICS Code was the basis of
the UK Stewardship Code).
52.
See Michael McKersie, The Stewardship Code and the Pattern of
Engagement By InstitutionalShareholders with Listed Companies, 5 CAPITAL MARKETS
L.J. 439, 439-40 (2010) (describing the Stewardship Code issued by the FRC).
Compare Simon C. Y. Wong, The UK Stewardship Code: A Missed
53.
Opportunityfor Higher Standards, RESPONSIBLE INVESTOR (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter
Wong, Missed Opportunity] (arguing for a stronger Code), with Chiu, supra note 29
(suggesting stewardship as the first step in a corporate paradigm shift).

553

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE

2015]

explain" requirement.54 After a consultation period, the FRC revised
the Stewardship Code in 2012 to address many of these clarity
55

concerns.

2.

Policies

According to the revised Stewardship Code, institutional investor
stewardship of portfolio companies is intended to foster the long-term
company success "in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital
also prosper," for the benefit of the economy as a whole.5 6 The Code's
presumption of the corporation's overall societal function is clear, as
it seeks to encompass a wide range of market participants as
stewards subject to the Code's provisions. 57 In allowing institutional
investors to outsource various functions associated with stewardship,
the Stewardship Code expressly "applies, by extension, to service
providers, such as proxy advisors and investment consultants."5 8 By
extending stewardship responsibilities to all service providers, the
Code envisions an expansive array of market participants
undertaking joint responsibility for stewardship and engagement. 59
The theory is that the benefits of total market stewardship will
devolve upon individual investors and the general public.60
The Stewardship Code is a "soft law" code of best practices that
derives

compliance

Signatories

must

from

its

"comply

either comply

or

explain"

provision.

with the Stewardship

61

Code's

Principles or disclose their noncompliance and explain why they are
unable to comply.62 This concept can be found in the Walker Report

54.
Sergakis, supra note 24, at 123 (describing the shortfalls of the initial code).
The Code lacked clarity overall. Comply or explain will be unpacked more fully below.
55.
See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO
THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachmentl
faO5e79c-22c6-4f8f-b5b3-2ab55ec41113/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) [http://perma.cc/82R426SU] (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
56.
STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, 1 1, at 1. The Stewardship Code
continues:
For investors, stewardship is more than just voting. Activities may include
monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy,
performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including
culture and remuneration. Engagement is purposeful dialogue with companies
on these matters as well as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes at
general meetings.
Id.

¶

4, at 1.
57.
See Sergakis, supra note 24, at 123 (pointing out the Code's premise that
"stewards are not merely a company's investors").
58.
STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, 1 2, at 2.
59.
See Sergakis, supra note 24, at 125.
60.
See STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, 1 1, at 1.
61.
See Chiu, supra note 29, at 388, 392.
62.
See STEWARDSHIP CODE, supranote 9, ¶ 3, at 4.
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and seeks to promote compliance through public opinion. 6 3 The
revised Stewardship Code offers guidance to both institutional
investors and beneficial owners on how to disclose and how to
interpret disclosures, respectively. 64 For signatory institutions, the
Stewardship Code states:
Those signatories that choose not to comply with one of the principles,
or not to follow the guidance, should deliver meaningful explanations
that enable the reader to understand their approach to stewardship. In
providing an explanation, the signatory should aim to illustrate how its
actual practices contribute to good stewardship and promote the
delivery of the institution's or its clients' investment objectives. They
should provide a clear rationale for their approach.65

On the other hand, the Stewardship Code suggests that
beneficiaries not make judgments categorically and pay "due regard"
to a signatory's specific circumstances, size, and complexity. 66
Although the revised Stewardship Code expanded greatly on just
what is meant by "comply or explain," some commentators have
questioned whether its guidance directed to beneficiaries relaxes
institutional compliance.6 7 The guidance continues:
Whilst clients and beneficiaries have every right to challenge a
signatory's explanations if they are unconvincing, they should not
evaluate explanations in a mechanistic way. Departures from the Code
should not be automatically treated as breaches. A signatory's clients
and beneficiaries should be careful to respond to the statements from
the signatory in a manner that supports the "comply or explain"
process and bears in mind the purpose of good stewardship. They
should put their views to the signatory and both parties should be
prepared to discuss the position.n

While the guidance is meant to alleviate concerns over a rigid
"comply or explain" set of rules,69 it is unclear how it will affect the
behavior of signatory institutions with already wide ranging
70
conceptions of stewardship.
3.

Principles

The Principles of the Code invite signatory institutions to
develop policies for engagement and stewardship and to disclose

63.
See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 48, at 17 ("Its status should be akin to
that of the Combined Code as a statement of best practice, with observance on a
similar 'comply or explain' basis.").
64.
See STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, 1 3-7, at 4.
65.
Id. ¶ 3, at 4.
66.
See id. T 6, at 4.
67.
See, e.g., Wong, Missed Opportunity, supra note 53 (noting that recent
changes in the Stewardship Code have resulted in relaxed compliance requirements in
some areas such as managing conflicts of interest).
68.
STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, ¶ 7, at 4.
69.
See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 48, at 11.
70.
See generally Wong, Missed Opportunity, supra note 53.
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those policies to beneficial owners. Because Principle 5 is a focus of
this Note, it will be discussed last. Principles 1 and 2 call for
institutional investors to develop and disclose policies for discharging
their stewardship responsibilities and managing conflicts of
interest. 71 Principle 3 simply directs institutional investors to
monitor their portfolio companies, and Principle 4 deals with setting
guidelines for when institutions will escalate their monitoring
activities.72
According to Principle 6, institutional investors should have a
clear policy for voting and disclosure of voting activity. Specifically,
Principle 6 guides institutions to "seek to vote all shares held" and
"not automatically support the board." 73 Principle 7 simply urges
periodic reporting of stewardship and voting activities, including a
suggestion that institutions "report at least annually to those to
whom they are accountable on their stewardship policy and its
execution." 74
Principle 5 involves collective action with other investors and
thus is perhaps the most well-suited to translate to jurisdictions other
than the United Kingdom and Europe.75 "At times," according to
Principle 5, "collaboration with other investors may be the most
effective manner in which to engage." 7 6 This is by no means a
surprising assertion given the high concentration of governance
rights in the hands of institutional investors.7 7 The guidance under
Principle 5 continues:
Institutional investors should disclose their policy on collective
engagement, which should indicate their readiness to work with other
investors through formal and informal groups when this is necessary to
achieve their objectives and ensure companies are aware of concerns.
The disclosure should also indicate the kinds of circumstances in which
the institutional investor would consider participating in collective
78

engagement.

While the Code overall may not square with current U.S. equity
market realities, Principle 5 may be a provision of substantial
domestic usefulness.

71.

See STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, at 6.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 7-8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 8-9,
Id. at 8.
See TONELLO & RABIMOV, supranote 1; IRRC Report, supra note 1.

78.

STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 9, at 9.
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B. RationalReticence: The Nature of InstitutionalInvestors
Institutional investors will realize little, if any, performance
value from proactive exercise of their governance rights; the
mobilization costs are simply too high.7 9 Institutional investors are
primarily concerned with, and specialize in, delivering comparatively
superior investment performance over short periods of time, while
minimizing costs and risk.8 0 Institutional investors have consistently
struggled to effectively monitor portfolio companies as stewards.8 1 In
fact, to do so would run contrary to their nature.8 2 This nature
therefore yields a maze of interest conflicts between institutional
investors and true stewardship of portfolio companies. 83
The short-term, comparative performance metrics upon which
the vast majority of portfolio managers and funds are evaluated
constrains institutional activism. 84 The performance of managers and
funds is often monitored on a quarterly basis compared to similar
funds or an index.85 This pervasive method of measuring performance
does not easily accommodate long-term dialogue, even though it may
potentially benefit individual shareholders in the long run.86 For
example, a mutual fund may engage in fundamental analysis of its
portfolio companies, aimed at identifying poor performance and
business strategy resulting from poor governance. 87 When this
analysis reveals substandard performance and governance, the fund
manager has two choices: (1) attempt to intervene and improve the

79.
Cf. Coffee, supra note 27, at 1283-85 ("[T]he primary explanation for
institutional passivity is not overregulation, but the insufficiency of existing incentives
to motivate institutional money managers to monitor."); Gilson & Gordon, supranote 3,
at 895 ("Institutional owners ... will assign a low value to governance rights since
their proactive exercise will not improve the relative performance on which the
institutional investor's profitability and ability to attract assets depends.").
80.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 889; Wong, Stewardship, supra note
1, at 406-07. Indeed, they are required to minimize risk through diversification to
maintain "diversified" status. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (2012).
81.
See Commission Green Paperon the EU Corporate Governance Framework,
¶ 2, at 11, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011), availableat http://ec.europa.eulinternal
market/company/docs/modern/com20ll-164_en.pdf [httpJ/perma.cet8JYV-B2YW] (archived
Jan. 31, 2015); Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1.
82.
Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1 ("Why is it so difficult for institutional
investors to act as stewards? In essence, it is because stewardship is not in their
genetic makeup.").
83.
For a general discussion of the conflicts of interest between institutional
investors and stewardship, see generally Simon C. Y. Wong, How Conflicts of Interest
Thwart InstitutionalInvestor Stewardship, BU'TERWORTHS J. OF INT'L BANKING & FIN.
L. 481 (Sept. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925485 [http://perma.cc/P4GAG3M5] (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
See Wong, Stewardship, supranote 1.
84.
See id. at 407.
85.
86.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 890.
See id.
87.
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company board's governance or (2) sell the position."8 Competitive
forces dictate that fund managers are not always incentivized to
attempt to intervene. This is because if the manager successfully
intervenes and engages the corporate board toward improvement of
the company's performance, all shareholders-including the fund's
competitors-will enjoy the benefits.8 9
Thus, institutional investor X is only incentivized toward
activism in portfolio company Y to the extent that X fund has a
higher stake in portfolio company Y (relative to the fund size) than
any other investor.o This is because, in the case of institutional
investor X, the costs of activism to fund Y would be less than their
profits otherwise. 9 ' In a market where fund managers are being
evaluated based on their fund's performance relative to other similar
funds, such a shared gain would provide no competitive advantage. 9 2
The result is that, even though it may ultimately benefit individual
owners, fund managers have no incentive to proactively engage
portfolio companies and therefore do not develop expertise in doing
so. 98
The fee structure of many institutional investors also attenuates

active engagement. Consider the case of a passive index fund,
designed to track the movements of a market index, such as the S&P
500 or the FTSE 100, over a long period of time. Considering the longterm objective and holding period of the fund, one might view an
index fund as a prime candidate for stewardship of its portfolio
companies. 94 Another chief objective of index funds, however, is low
management fees-fees that would rise substantially should the fund
actively engage in stewardship activities." As a result, index fund
managers allocate very little, if any, resources to portfolio company
96
engagement.

88.
See id.; Coffee, supra note 27, at 1281 (highlighting this "trade-off" faced by
institutional investors).
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 890.
89.
90.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1052-53 (2007)
("[Institutional activism] will increase a fund's relative returns only to the extent that
the fund has a higher stake in the portfolio company (relative to the fund size) than
competing funds do and the costs of activism to the fund are less than the profits from
that differential.").
91.
See id.
92.
See id.; see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 890 ("But a shared gain,
unlike the private gain of a successful trade, provides little competitive advantage to
the proactive investment manager whose portfolio products and services are chosen in
comparison to competitors offering similar products or services."); Wong, Stewardship,
supra note 1, at 407.
93.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 890.
94.
See Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1, at 409.
95.
See id.
96.
See id.
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The regulatory landscape in the United States further deters
activism. For example, mutual fund management must make
semiannual disclosures of the quantities and values of the fund's
securities.97 As a result, it is unlikely that mutual funds will be able
to accumulate positions in portfolio companies without drawing
market attention.9 8 Additionally, in order to qualify for substantial
tax benefits under subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code, and
"diversified" status under the Investment Company Act, mutual
funds must maintain high levels of diversification." The mandate to
diversify restrains a fund's ability to take a position in any individual
company substantial enough to draw the ear of company
management.10o As a final example, by definition, open-end mutual
funds must be prepared to redeem their shares upon the request of
any shareholder at any time and on short notice.1 0 1 This creates
resource uncertainty for the fund manager and makes activism more
with regulatory constraints overall
difficult. 102 Compliance
diminishes institutional incentives and ability to monitor corporate
boards.10 3
Thus, there exists an agency gap between the relatively large
concentration of governance rights possessed by institutional
investors and the low value they themselves assign to those
governance rights.1 04
C. The Emergence of Activist Shareholders
105
"Activist shareholder" is no longer a strictly pejorative term.
Once designated as crowds of "locusts" and "corporate raiders,"106

See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 29(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (2012).
97.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1049.
98.
To be a "diversified company" under the Act, 75 percent of a mutual fund's
99.
assets must comply with the limitation that (a) the fund may own no more than 10
percent of the outstanding securities of a portfolio company and (b) the stock of one
portfolio company may not constitute more than 5 percent of the value of the fund's
assets. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (2012).
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1049.
100.
See id. at 1049-50 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2012)).
101.
See id. at 1050-53.
102.
See id. at 1049.
103.
See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3 (terming this gap "the agency
104.
costs of agency capitalism").
105.
E.g., Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbariansat the Gate; Instead, a Force for
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/
[http://
06/no-bararians-at-the-gate-instead-a-force-for-change1%phptrue&_type=blogs&_r-0
perma.ccIB8UF-JAYF] (archived Jan. 23, 2015).
106. _ Andrew Willis, Corporate Raiders Now Wearing the White Hat, GLOBE
& VAIL, Aug. 18, 2006, at B16, available at https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/
ArticleNews/story/gam/20050818/RWILLIS18 [https://perma.cc/56GX-MTPR] (archived
Jan. 23, 2015); Activist Investors: Flight of the Locusts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2009, at 63,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/13446602 [http://perma.cc/QA82-JYE6]
(archived Jan. 23, 2015).

2015]

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE

559

activist shareholders-activist hedge funds in particular 0 7 -have
come to serve an important role in improving shareholder value by
serving as a check on incumbent management power.1 08
In general, activist investors are those investors that
aggressively attempt to influence the decision making of corporate
boards. 109 Activist hedge funds seek to influence corporate decision
making by obtaining toehold positions in target companies, often
soliciting the support of institutional investors for their proposals.110
Activist hedge funds share the following characteristics with the
overall hedge fund sector: they are (i) pooled, privately organized
investment vehicles; (ii) administered by professional investment
managers who serve as general partners (who have made a
substantial investment and they are compensated on the basis of
performance); (iii) with lock up periods of at least six months; and (iv)
that are not widely available to the public, with a small number of
sophisticated investors (usually high net worth individuals and, more
recently, institutions and retail investors)."'
The term activist investor earned a negative connotation
beginning in the 1960s when "corporate raiders" launched attempts to
take over companies in which they owned stock, often through the use
of coercive cash tender offers.11 2 Through the 1980s, activist investors

107.
The terms "hedge fund" and "activist" are frequently thrown around by the
media but are more difficult to define than their daily usage might suggest. The D.C.
Circuit recently reasoned that hedge funds are more readily defined by what they are
not. Indeed, they are (and are designed to be) exempt from the Investment Company
Act, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") and key portions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They are not
completely unregulated, however, as they are still subject to the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws, commodities laws, and the Advisers Act. For further discussion, see
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Kuang-Wei Chueh, Note, Is
Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for the Market?, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 724, 725
(2008).
108.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47, 49 (2012) ("These investments can
be expected to make incumbents more accountable and to reduce agency costs and
managerial slack."); Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities ofHedge FundActivism:
Some EmpiricalEvidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 462 (2013) ("[A]ctivist hedge funds
are seen as capable of disciplining corporate management, thus filling the monitoring
gap created by 'rationally apathetic' institutional shareholders.").
109.
Chueh, supranote 107, at 729.
110.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 897.
111.
See Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and
Financial Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
AND INSTITUTIONS:
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101, 115 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E.

Litan eds., 2007).
112.
Andrew N. Vollmer & Paul R.Q. Wolfson, The Williams Act: A Truly
"Modern"Assessment, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

FIN. REGULATION 1 (Oct. 22, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/
2011/10/The-Williams-Act-A-Truly-Modern-Assessment.pdf [http://perma.cc/7GYE-WFHV]
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developed a reputation for being highly aggressive, self-interested,
short-term investors-"barbarians at the gate," so to speak. 113 Since
that time, however, activist investors have been forced to change
their approach due to fundamental changes to the corporate
governance landscape.' 1 4 Perhaps the most important change was the
arming of corporate managers with takeover defenses such as poison
15
pills and staggered board terms.s
These defenses, in combination
with the development of state antitakeover statutes, made gaining
control of a target company virtually impossible for activist
investors. 116 Thus, activist investors like hedge funds no longer rely
on control for influence." 7
To influence corporate management and strategy today, hedge
fund activism takes many forms. These forms include exerting public
pressure on company executives, running proxy contests to gain seats
on the board of directors, and engaging in litigation." 8 One recent
(and amusing) example of an activist hedge fund using public
pressure involved a hedge fund called Third Point and a heating oil
distribution company known as Star Gas. 9 Third Point, having
accumulated a 6 percent stake in Star Gas, became dissatisfied with
then-CEO Irik Sevin's management of the company and went about
not only criticizing his management but also openly questioning his
personal character:
[H]ow is it possible that you selected your elderly 78-year-old mom to
serve on the Company's Board of Directors and as a full-time employee
providing employee and unitholder services? We further wonder under
what theory of corporate governance does one's mom sit on a Company
board. Should you be found derelict in the performance of your
executive duties, as we believe is the case, we do not believe your mom
20
is the right person to fire you from your job.1

'

2
Sevin resigned one month later.'

(archived Jan. 31, 2015); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377, 377 (1969)
[hereinafter Cash Tender Offers].
113.
See Stevenson, supra note 105 (discussing evolving attitudes toward
activist shareholders over time).
114.
See Vollmer & Wolfson, supra note 112, at 7-8.
115.
See id. at 8-12. It should be noted that many companies have since dropped
their staggered board provisions, due in part to Lucian Bebchuk's Shareholder's Rights
initiative at Harvard Law School.
116.
See id.
117.
See id. at 8.
118.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1029.
119.
See Letter from Daniel S. Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer, Third Point LLC, to
Irik P. Sevin, Chairman, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Star Gas Partners L.P.,
available at Third Point Demands That Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns
Keys to Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/third-point-demands-that-star-gas-ceo-irik-sevin-resigns-and-returns-keys-tocompany-car-54051747.html [http://perma.ccfMV9E-4WYH] (archived Feb. 24, 2015).
120.
Id.
121.
See Heather Wilson, Star Gas CEO Irik Sevin Resigns, Replacement
Named, MKT. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2005, 6:19 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/star-
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Over time, court approval of takeover defenses like poison pills

and federal and state disclosure requirements have worked to
gradually constrain the modus operandi of investors intent on
agitating for change in corporate boardrooms. Ultimately, this
dynamic produced what we now know as activist investors, or more
commonly, activist hedge funds. Often unable to go around corporate
boards to achieve desired results, activist hedge funds specialize in
going through them. Activist hedge funds frequently seek board
representation in addition to exerting pressure on boards publicly
through mass, or even social, media.1 22
D. RationalReticence and Activism
Hedge funds have taken an active role leveraging institutional
governance rights in the context of transactions involving potential
changes in control. 1 23 Although institutional investors lack incentive
for active engagement and stewardship, a great deal of empirical
evidence indicates that institutional investors are "rationally
reticent." 124 Rational reticence refers to the propensity of institutional
investors to respond to governance proposals rather than propose
them. 125 Put simply, owing to the nature of institutional investors,

institutional funds are responsive, not proactive.' 26 Activist investors
are therefore well-situated to serve as governance intermediaries.
Activist interests are often closely aligned with the interests of
individual shareholders of their target companies.1 27 Unlike mutual
funds, hedge funds are structured and regulated in such a way that
activism is nearly always feasible and profitable. There are latent
economies of scale between rationally reticent institutional investors
and activist hedge funds in the exercise of governance rights.
gas-ceo-irik-sevin-resigns-replacement-named [http://perma.cc/9QB4-HFAV] (archived
May 24, 2015).
122.
E.g., Aaron Pressman, Carl Icahn's Multibillion-Dollar Tweet Boosts Apple
Stock, YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 13, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/
carl-icahn-multibillion-dollar-tweet-boosts-apple-stock-205938760.html [http://perma.cefRE6K3MVR] (archived Feb. 24, 2015); Icahn Tweets He Will Send Open Letter to Apple,
REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2014, 3:58 PM), http/www.reuters.com/article/2014lO/08/us-apple-icahntweet-idUSKCNOHX25S20141008 [http://perma.cc/L963-YUEJ] (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
123.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1034.
124.
See Coffee, supra note 27, at 1281 ("[A]gents controlling institutional
investors . . . have little reason to become active participants."); Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 3, at 867 (discussing the structural shift from individual shareholders to
institutional shareholders and the role of activist shareholders in this new dynamic).
125.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 867.
126.
See id.
127.
See id. ("The role of a new entrant into the governance story, the activist
shareholder, is to increase the value of the vote held by the institutions by teeing up
the intervention choices at low cost to the institutional owners. If the intervention is
successful, the activist's equity position will increase in value, as will that of the
institutions.").
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Consider, as an example, the proposed acquisition by Deutche
Borse (DB) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). DB proposed a bid
for LSE at the end of 2004,128 and, not to be outdone, Euronext (a
competing exchange) announced its interest in LSE soon after.12 9 But
the Children's Investment Fund Management (TCI), 130 having
accumulated a 5 percent stake in DB, opposed the deal.13 1 TCI argued
that DB had other, more promising avenues of value creation for its
shareholders with its excess cash. 132 Soon, Atticus Capital, a U.S.based fund that owned roughly 2 percent of DB's shares, joined TCI
in opposition. 133 By February 2005, several mutual funds,
spearheaded by TCI and Atticus, held roughly 35 percent of DB's
stock and overtly opposed the deal. 134
Ultimately, with between 40 percent and 60 percent of its
shareholders opposing the bid, DB abandoned the acquisition attempt
and promised to pursue a plan to distribute the cash to
shareholders. 135 After DB abandoned its bid, one institutional
investor's representative said,
The hedge funds have done
about companies, traditional
achieve our aims. We were
couldn't have done it without

III.

a marvelous job. No matter how we feel
managers simply cannot move as fast to
right behind [the hedge funds], but we
them. 1 3 6

THE CURRENT DEBATE

A. Activist ShareholdersAs Governance Intermediaries
Because hedge funds are largely unregulated, they possess
substantial economies of scale compared to similarly-sized

128.
Norma Cohen, Jeremy Grant & Patrick Jenkins, Deutsche Bdrse Courts
LSE for EuropeanExchange Union, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2004, at 23.
129.
Norma Cohen, LSE War Looms as Euronext Confirms Intent, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Dec. 21, 2004, at 22.
130.
Until 2014, this London-based hedge fund paid to the Children's
Investment Fund Foundation one third of its 1.5 percent management fee and 0.5
percent of any profits exceeding 11 percent. See Andrea Gerlin, Ex- Wife of TCI's Hohn
to Get $530 Million in London Divorce Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://
washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-NANFPG6KLVRL01-1AJML6IRE1685DGODSP
3NK5050 [http://perma.cc/8G8C-JAEE] (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
131.
Martin Waller, Fund Says Opposition to Borse's LSE Bid Is Mounting,
TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 18 2005, at Bus. 43; Richard Wray, Beirse Rebel Threatens To Derail
LSE Bid, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 17, 2005, at 21.
132.
See Wray, supra note 131.
133.
Norma Cohen, Deutsche Barse 'Empire Building,' FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan.
17, 2005, at 19.
134.
Louise Armitstead, Shareholders Revolt in Bid to Topple Seifert, SUNDAY
TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 20, 2005, at Bus. 1.
135.
Louise Armitstead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY
TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 13, 2005, at Bus. 14.
Id.
136.
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institutional owners. 1 37 There are over 8,500 hedge funds in the
United States managing $1.74 trillion in assets. 138 This figure
indicates that the average hedge fund has assets of around $200
million, with the largest hedge funds managing assets over $20
billion. 139 These numbers may be understated, though, because
unlike mutual funds and pension funds, hedge funds frequently use
hard-to-quantify leverage and investment derivatives.1 40 As a result,
hedge funds can concentrate a significant portion of their assets in a
single position, unlike a mutual fund with comparable net assets. 141
Hedge funds have significantly more flexibility in their
operations than mutual funds and pension funds. Unlike mutual
funds and pension funds, hedge funds need only comply with
regulatory laws that apply to investors generally. These laws include
disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act' 4 2 as well as the short-swing profit rules under section 16(b).

143

Hedge fund managers must also make quarterly disclosures about
their holdings, pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange
Act.
In practice, most small- and many medium-sized hedge funds
can avoid making any disclosures as long as they keep a substantial
portion of their holdings in nonregistered derivatives and debt
instruments. Under 13(f), hedge fund managers need only disclose
holdings of "registered equity securities"-i.e., traded shares and
options listed on an exchange.1 44 Therefore, holdings of other options
and derivatives do not need to be disclosed. The result is that hedge
funds can use derivatives to accumulate large economic positions in
target companies without disclosure, unless they cross the 5 percent
threshold under Section 13(d). Moreover, holdings of "13(f)
securities"1 4 5 less than $100 million need not be disclosed at all.1 46
Incentives for hedge funds to monitor portfolio companies are
quite different from those of traditional institutional investors,

137.
See Kahan & Rock, supranote 90, at 1062-63.
138.
See PREQIN SPECIAL REPORT: US HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 3 (2013), available
at https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Preqin.SpeciaReport-USHedgeFundIndustry
.Sep-13.pdf [https/perma.cc/74DL-XRUP) (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
139.
See Bridgewater, J.P. Morgan Top List of 100 Largest Hedge Funds, MKT.
WATCH (May 12, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2014/05/12/
bridgewater-j-p-morgan-top-list-of- 100-largest-hedge-funds/ [http://perma.cc157T7-4MFC]
(archived Feb. 24, 2015).
140.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1063.
141.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (2012).
142.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (requiring disclosure when an investor owns
more than 5 percent of the equity securities of a public company).
143.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), which applies to officers,
directors, and 10 percent shareholders of a company under § 16(a).
144.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2014).
145.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(c).
146.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1).
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rendering hedge funds a more capable corporate monitor. As
discussed above, institutional investors, such as mutual funds, lack
incentive to engage and monitor portfolio companies. 14 7
Unlike mutual fund managers, hedge fund managers are not
typically evaluated based on returns relative to a benchmark. 14 8
Rather, hedge funds focus on absolute returns when assessing a
fund's performance and determining manager compensation. 149 Thus,
the higher the absolute returns achieved by the fund, the greater the
benefit to both managers and investors. Naturally, like mutual fund
managers, hedge fund managers do want to retain and attract
investors through their performance, and some level of performance
benchmarking relative to an index is inevitable because that is what
investors generally expect. 150 However, hedge fund portfolios
resemble indices much less than mutual funds.' 5' In fact, hedge
funds rarely even resemble one another. 152 Therefore hedge fund
managers generally do not need to worry about competitor funds freeriding on governance activism. 153 The relatively high level of
sophistication among investors in hedge funds may lead them to
ignore any fear of free riding and allocate their investments
specifically to activist funds.' 5 4
Hedge fund fee structures provide further monitoring incentives.
These fee structures are weighted heavily based on profits earned and
reward managers for maximizing returns to fund investors. 155
Generally, the base percentage fee charged for assets under
management is low, and the fee for bottom line profits is high, often
in the range of 20 percent.1 56 Moreover, most hedge fund managers
have a substantial portion of their own personal wealth invested in
the fund.1 5 7 The performance-based fee structure, combined with the
hedge fund manager's personal wealth maximization incentives, both
serve to align the hedge fund manager's interests with the fund's
shareholders.
In general, activist hedge funds tend to accumulate positions in
target companies for the purpose of engaging in activism; some
commentators have come to refer to this sort of activism as "offensive"

147.

See supra Part II.B.

148.

See

FIN.

SERVS.

AUTH.,

DISCUSSION

PAPER

05/4,

HEDGE FUNDS:

A

DIscUSSION OF RISK AND REGULATORY ENGAGEMENT 10 (2005), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp0504.pdf.
149.
See id.
150.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1065.
151.
See id.
152.
See id.
See id. at 1066.
153.
Id. at n.216.
154.
155.
See id. at 1064.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
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activism. 158 This, of course, presents a significant departure from the
nature of institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension
funds. If mutual funds or pension funds engage in activism at all, it
tends to be from a "defensive" posture.1 59 That is, an institutional
investor may become active in a portfolio company in which it has a
preexisting position that it has identified as underperforming. 160 As
noted previously, however, institutional fund managers are much
more likely to simply sell the underperforming position. 161
These different approaches to activism among hedge funds and
institutional investors reflect fundamentally different profit-making
strategies. Activist hedge funds, on one hand, actually use activism as
their profit strategy by accumulating toehold positions in target
companies that allow them to agitate for change, and ultimately,
profit from their activism. 162 On the other hand, institutional
investors do not use activism as a profit-making strategy-i.e., they
do not take positions in portfolio companies for the purpose of
profiting from activism.16 3
This fundamental strategic difference should not be surprising in
light of the fact that institutional investors hold themselves out as a
low-cost conduit for diversification. Indeed, one factor cited by
commentators as to why institutional investors have proven to be
ineffective corporate monitors is excessive diversification. 164 But
diversification and activism do not mix. Intrinsically, activism
requires a targeted approach in which a fund takes a large position in
only a few companies.1 65
B. The Nature of Hedge Fund Activism
The inherently confrontational nature of hedge fund activism can
make life difficult for corporate managers and their advisors, not to

158.
See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds 7-9, 15-16 (Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 38/2011, 2011), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1932805 [http://perma.ccUTP6-S6SG] (archived Jan. 31, 2015).
159.
See id. at 8.
160.
See id.; see, e.g., Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional
Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 231-32 (1996) (outlining selection
criteria).
161.
See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 893.
162.
See id. at 904; Cheffins & Armour, supra note 158, at 8; Kahan & Rock,
supra note 90, at 1068.
163.
See Jeffrey Ubben & David Haarmeyer, With Activism Comes
Accountability, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR'S ALPHA 60, 60 (July/Aug. 2006) (contrasting
activist investor returns with the performance of traditional money managers).
164.
See, e.g., Wong, Stewardship, supranote 1, at 407.
165.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1070; Ubben & Haarmeyer, supra
note 163, at 60.
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mention produce some highly entertaining anecdotes. 166 It comes as
no surprise, then, that on the basis of such anecdotes, long-standing
proponents of incumbent management-preeminent corporate law
firm Wachtell Lipton-are petitioning the SEC to adopt measures
that they believe will make life more difficult for activist hedge
funds. 16 7
As discussed above, activist hedge funds are in a substantially
better position to monitor corporate boards than mutual funds. 168 But
is Wachtell Lipton right? Are activist hedge funds more trouble than
they are worth? Are they abusing Section 13(d)'s current ten-day
disclosure window to harm companies in the long run?1 6 9
Activist hedge funds are often anecdotally accused of being
excessively myopic, sacrificing the long-term interests of companies
for a quick buck. 170 The empirical evidence, however, indicates that
this perception is not only unwarranted but also contrary to the
realities of hedge fund activism. Activist hedge funds do not choose
their targets at random or based on factors such as the number of
takeover defenses a company has in place.171 Rather, activists tend to
target firms that are underperforming relative to their peers, with
low market value relative to book value.'7 2 Moreover, activist hedge
funds are not excessively short-term in nature as is often claimed;
their median holding period is around one year. 173
The arrival of an activist shareholder is widely viewed by the
market as good news. Indeed, abnormal returns around the day an
activist crosses the 5 percent threshold are about 6 percent. 174 The

166.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
167.
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 1-2 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Wachtell
Petition], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/201 1/petn4-624.pdf [http://
perma.cc/FJX7-28YG] (archived Jan. 31, 2015) (petitioning the SEC to "shorten the
reporting deadline and expand the definition of beneficial ownership under the
reporting rules" under the 1934 Act).
168.
See supra Part II.
169.
See Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company;
Wreck the Economy, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

FIN. REGULATION (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), http:/Iblogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2013/
02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [http://
perma.cc/HJD4-2PFW] (archived Jan. 22, 2015) (scrutinizing Harvard Law School
Professor Lucian Bebchuk's theory of "shareholder democracy").
170.
See, e.g., id.
171.
See Bray, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 16.
172.
See id.; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Bray & Wei Jiang, The Long-term Effects
of Hedge Fund Activism, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015) (manuscript at
5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3lpapers.cfm?abstractid=2291577 [http://perma.cc/
Z87D-8DMJ] (archived Jan. 22, 2015).
173.
See Bray, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 16, at 1731.
174.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Bray, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Wei Jiang, PreDisclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1,
18 (2013) (examining empirical data contradicting many factual premises included in
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claim has always been that the tactics employed by' activists to
generate such short-term returns cause significant harm to the
company in the long run.11 5 According to a recent study by Lucian
Bebchuk, Alon Bray, and Wei Jiang, however, this claim is also false.
To the contrary, the operating performance of companies targeted by
activist interventions improves during the five years following the
intervention.1 76 This is also the case for adversarial interventions,
which account for around 22 percent of activist interventions but
generate the large majority of media coverage.17 7 Moreover, there is
substantial empirical evidence indicating that activists are not
abusing 13(d)'s ten-day disclosure window to accumulate large blocks
of stock nor are they utilizing advances in trading technology to
accumulate larger pre-disclosure positions than they used to.178
The empirical evidence indicates that, overall, activist hedge
funds do not deserve the popular perception attributed to them and
perpetuated by proponents of incumbent management. Tightening
the disclosure rules under Section 13(d) would be potentially harmful
to investors. To the extent that such tightening discourages activists
from accumulating outside blockholdings, shareholders would not
receive (a) the significant abnormal returns associated with the
arrival of an activist and (b) the reduced agency costs associated with
possibility that an activist will emerge. 179
C. The Williams Act
A brief analysis of the passage of Williams Act, and its
accompanying fundamental changes to the corporate governance
landscape, demonstrates why changes to tighten the rules under
13(d) are unnecessary and potentially harmful to the overall
economy.
The Williams Act was intended to protect individual
shareholders from "corporate raiders" of the time who launched
Wachtell Lipton's rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the tenday window established by section 13(d) of the Williams Act).
175.
But even the case for favoring long-term shareholders in general is not
clear cut. See generally Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term
Shareholders, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
176.
See Bebchuk, Bray & Jiang, supra note 172, at 61-65 ("We do not find any
evidence that such interventions produce long-term declines in operating performance
thereby 'sacrificing the future for a quick buck.' To the contrary, such interventions
tend to produce improvements in operating performance during the five-year period
following them.").
177.
Id. at 65-69 ("We conclude that the alleged adverse effect on long-term
performance is not found when one focuses on adversarial interventions, either.").
178.
See Bebchuk, Bray, Jackson & Jiang, supra note 174, at 14-18.
179.
Cf. id. at 18 ("First, reducing the incidence and magnitude of outside
investments in large blocks of public-company stock will impose direct costs because
shareholders will no longer enjoy the superior returns long associated with the arrival
of an activist, five-percent blockholder.").
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takeover attempts, often through the use of coercive cash tender
offers. 180 While corporate control contests had previously been
conducted by proxy fights or consensual share-for-share exchanges,
the 1960s saw the proliferation of the unsolicited cash tender offer as
a "legal device to effect takeovers." 8 1 In a standard 1960s cash tender
offer, the offeror sought to acquire control of the target corporation by
publicly proposing to buy a stated percentage of the target's
outstanding equity securities. 1 82 The offeror would publish newspaper
advertisements soliciting current shareholders to tender their shares
at a set offer price, including a premium over the current market
price.183
In extreme cases, the tender offer would only be open for a couple
days, affording investors and company management very little time
to weigh the pros and cons of the offer.1 84 In short, the main problem
with cash tender offers, unlike proxy fights or share-for-share
exchanges, was that they enabled the corporate raider to "operate in
almost complete secrecy concerning their intentions."1 85
The Williams Act was intended to fill the regulatory gap that
existed at the time (into which cash tender offers fell),1 86 by stating
an exception to the general rule that outside stockholders of a
company may invest anonymously.' 8 7 Federal securities laws already
provided protection for individual investors and company
management from proxy fights and share-for-share exchanges, but no
such disclosure requirements existed for cash tender offers. 188
Senator Williams voiced particular discomfort with the disparate
protections afforded to investors subject to a cash takeover bid, as
compared with investors affected by an exchange offer or proxy
fight.' 8 9

180.
See Vollmer & Wolfson, supra note 112, at 5.
181.
See id.
182.
See Cash Tender Offers, supra note 112, at 377-78 (explaining the
mechanics of cash tender offers in the 1960s).
See id. ("The offeror's obligation to purchase (take up) tendered shares
183.
[was] typically conditioned on the tender of a set minimum number of securities."
(footnote omitted)).
Vollmer & Wolfson, supra note 112, at 5.
184.
113 CONG. REc. 855 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison
185.
Williams).
186.
See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (considering whether an
Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act and whether it violated the Commerce
Clause).
Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 108, at 43-45 (noting that disclosure
187.
rules required by the Williams Act do not apply to investors).
See Vollmer & Wolfson, supranote 112, at 5.
188.
See 113 CONG. REC. 855 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen.
189.
Harrison Williams) ("The failure to protect investors in connection with a cash takeover
bid is in sharp contrast to the regulatory requirements applicable where one company
offers to exchange its shares for those of another, or the protections applicable to a
proxy fight for corporate control.").
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As the originally drafted bill made its way through Congress, it
was met with significant opposition, 19 0 primarily due to the concern
that its onerous disclosure requirements would make it too difficult
for shareholders to hold corporate managers accountable.1 91 After
revision and reintroduction, Senator Williams framed the intent of
the bill, remarking that he had "taken extreme care with this
legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate
interests
of
the
corporation,
management,
and
shareholders .... Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the
balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of
the offeror."1 92 Thus, the Williams Act reflects a deliberate decision
by Congress to balance the interests of outside blockholders and
incumbent managers. 193 Senator Williams ultimately resolved that
outside blockholders "should not be discouraged, since they often
serve as a useful purpose by providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management." 194
As a result of the Williams Act, section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act currently requires disclosure by any person acquiring
more than 5 percent of a registered company's stock within ten days
of acquisition.1 95 Senator Williams justified the 5 percent threshold in
1970 on the grounds that in many instances, a 5 to 10 percent
interest in a company was a controlling interest, and therefore,
disclosure of such an interest was necessary for investor protection.' 96
Likewise, another congressman noted that an interest in excess of 5
percent in some companies gives the holder substantial control.1 97
The SEC has opened the door for further downward revision of
both the disclosure threshold percentage and the disclosure
window.1 98 Section 13(g) of the Act now defines beneficial ownership

190.
See 112 CONG. REC. 19,004 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1966).
191.
See 90 CONG. REC. 134 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1944).
192.
113 CONG. REC. 854 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison
Williams).
193.
See generally Bebehuk & Jackson, supra note 108, at 41 ("The drafters of
the Williams Act made a conscious choice not to impose a hard 5% limit on predisclosure accumulations of shares, instead striking a balance between the costs and
benefits of disclosure of blockholders' activities to avoid excessive deterrence of the
accumulation of these outside blocks.").
194.
113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967).
195.
Securities Exchange Act 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2014).
196.
See 116 CONG. REC. 3024 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970).
197.
See 116 CONG. REC. 40188 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1970).
198.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929R(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1866 (2010) (amending section 13 of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and specifically authorizing SEC to reduce the trigger period for
disclosure); Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www
.sec.gov/news/speechl2011/spchl2l5llmls.htm [http://perma.cc/2V4R-MRY8] (archived
Feb. 24, 2015) (remarking that the SEC planned to review and modernize beneficial
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to include "security-based swap [s]."19 This more restrictive definition
has taken away one method activist hedge funds previously used to
accumulate substantial positions in portfolio companies without
disclosure. Even so, many are calling for the SEC to follow the UK's
lead by further reducing the ownership threshold and reporting
window. 20 The United Kingdom now imposes an ownership
20
disclosure threshold of 3 percent and a two-day reporting window. 1
Such measures by the SEC, which may stifle activism that
substantially benefits individual shareholders, are not the solution,
and fail to take into account changes in the market for corporate
governance since the enactment of the Williams Act. 202 Moreover,
such proposals are inconsistent with the Williams Act's aim to avoid
203
tipping the balance in favor of incumbent management.

IV. THE PRINCIPLE

5 COMPROMISE

The SEC is under considerable pressure to follow the UK's lead
in reducing the 13(d) reporting threshold and window. 204 But, reforms
like those adopted in the United Kingdom are generally justified by
false preconceptions of the nature of activist hedge funds and
discount the valuable role that hedge funds serve in the market for
corporate governance. If the SEC adopts additional restraints, such
changes should be accompanied by a compromise for activist hedge
funds: the maintenance
and public disclosure by domestic
institutional investors of policies for collective action.

ownership reporting rules, including whether to shorten ten-day window and whether
to include use of cash-settled equity swaps).
199.
Securities Exchange Act 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (2014).
200.
See, e.g., Wachtell Petition, supra note 167, at 1.
201.

See FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,

DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY RULES

§§ 5.1.2, 5.8.3 (2013), availableat http://media.fshandbook.info/content/ftdl/DTR.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7GVP-TFRX] (archived Jan. 22, 2015) (requiring shareholders to notify the
UK issuer of the percentage
of shareholder's voting rights when it
"reaches ... 3% . . . and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100%" in no later than two
trading days). The Wachtell petition points to several foreign jurisdictions that have
reduced their disclosure windows to suggest that the United States is "falling behind."
Wachtell Petition, supra note 167, at 4.
202.
Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 108, at 45-47 (identifying the criticisms
of the SEC's proposed reporting period window); Vollmer & Wolfson, supranote 112, at
7-19 ("The market for corporate governance has changed dramatically since the
Williams Act was passed, in three principal respects: A. the proliferation of state
antitakeover statutes and takeover defenses; B. the rise of institutional shareholders;
C. growth of active shareholder engagement.").
203.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
204.
See, e.g., Wachtell Petition, supra note 167, at 1-7 (offering reasons why
the current reporting deadlines are deficient).
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A. The UK Stewardship Code's Principle5 as a Compromise for
Activist Hedge Funds
Activist hedge funds serve an important role in the market for
corporate governance by leveraging the enormous governance rights
held by rationally reticent institutional investors. 205 Additional
reforms under consideration by the SEC may negatively impact the
ability of activist hedge funds to serve in this role. Institutional
investors have proven to be ineffective corporate monitors because to
do so would be contrary to their nature.2 06 As such, adoption of an
entire best practices code, such as the Stewardship Code, which
attempts to force institutional investors to monitor and engage
portfolio companies, is unlikely to result in a meaningful system of
corporate accountability. Activist hedge funds have often stepped up
to assume the role of corporate monitor, and their interests should
continue to be balanced with the interests of incumbent management,
just as they were when the Williams Act was enacted.
The SEC should promulgate the language and rationale of the
Stewardship Code's Principle 5 as a regulation under the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Principle 5 encourages institutional investors
to maintain and disclose policies for collective action. Within the
context of the domestic market for corporate governance, disclosure of
such policies by institutional investors could prove useful to activist
hedge funds that are attempting to evaluate which opportunities for
activism to pursue.
In 2013, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar emphasized the
important role institutional investors should play in corporate
governance, calling on institutional investors to lend their collective
voice to the ongoing corporate governance conversation. 207
Development and disclosure of collective action policies by
institutional intermediaries would indeed give voice to institutions,
within a context where they can actually be effective-that is,
through the combination of highly concentrated governance rights
and activist investor proposals. Additionally, this solution would
contain agency costs by keeping incumbent managers on notice of the
circumstances in which outside discipline by shareholder owners is a
distinct possibility.

205.
See supra Parts II.C-D.
206.
See supra Part I1.B.
207.
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Address at the Georgia State
University Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR) Workshop (Apr. 19, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/SpeechlDetail/Speech/l365171515808#.VD1-Pb6YZUQ
[http://perma.ccIM2B9-QVLT] (archived Jan. 22, 2015) ("We need to hear their views on
the benefits of transparency through disclosure, corporate governance, appropriate
compensation structures and amounts, and other important issues.").
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The success of activist proposals is often predicated on the
support they are able to obtain for their proposals from large
institutional investors. 20 8 This dynamic has always implicated a
substantial cost-benefit analysis by activists on the front end of any
potential activism. The costs to activists, however, have already been
magnified by the recently adopted, more restrictive definition of
beneficial ownership. Activists are no longer able to obtain
meaningful toehold positions in target companies through the use of
security-based swaps without disclosure. Lowering the reporting
threshold and shortening the disclosure window will further
compound the difficulty activist hedge funds will face in carrying out
their strategies.
Institutional investor disclosure of collective action and voting
policies may alleviate some of the additional strain that recent
reforms and proposals have, and propose to have, on activist hedge
fund effectiveness. Through public disclosure of collective action and
voting policies, activist hedge funds will be able to gain a sense of the
institutional investor support they are likely to receive for a given
proposal, before undertaking any action or expense. Moreover, they
will be able to incorporate a more meaningful measure of likelihood of
success into their cost-benefit analyses. Activist hedge funds will thus
be better equipped to formulate activism strategies ex ante that are
contingent on the support and strength of institutional investors. 09
As a result, the chilling effects of a lower ownership threshold or
disclosure window on hedge fund activism will be mitigated to a
degree.
B. Changed Circumstances:Activist Hedge Funds Are the Superior
CorporateMonitor
In resolving to allow activist hedge funds to continue serving
their role as governance intermediaries, it is important to recognize
that the current corporate governance landscape looks nothing like it
did over four decades ago. As discussed above, the Williams Act (and
its corresponding ownership threshold and disclosure window) was
enacted for the protection of a diffuse shareholder base, in response to
a wave of (sometimes coercive) cash tender offers, against which
company management was virtually powerless to defend.
The canonical theory of a widely dispersed ownership base no
longer exists. American equity ownership is now highly concentrated
in the hands of large, highly sophisticated institutional investors,

208.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
209.
Even if a mutual fund simply had a policy of voting with the
recommendation of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), such information would be
helpful to activist hedge funds.
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such as mutual funds and pension funds, and activist hedge funds
need their support to affect corporate change.2 10
To an extent, management now has the upper hand in a
corporate governance contest due to numerous takeover defenses that
have been developed in the time since the Williams Act's passage.2 1
Perhaps due in part to the proliferation of takeover defenses, activist
hedge funds have been constrained to operate through starkly
different tactics and strategies than the corporate raiders of decades
past. There is a growing body of empirical evidence that demonstrates
that activist hedge funds overall do not seek control and are no more
aggressive or short-term focused than any other type of investor. 212
Activist hedge funds should not be prevented from serving their
role as governance intermediaries because they are superior
corporate monitors to rationally reticent institutional investors. 213
Institutional investors make for inadequate corporate monitors
because engaging in long-term corporate strategy with portfolio
company management is contrary to their business model. 2 14 Activist
hedge funds, on the other hand, specialize precisely in monitoring
corporate management and possess advanced expertise in doing so.
As such, it would be counterproductive to attempt to force
institutional investors to monitor portfolio companies while
relegating activist hedge funds to the corporate governance sideline.
Therefore, new constraints on the ability of activist hedge funds to
monitor corporate management should be balanced with requiring
institutional investor development and disclosure of collective action
policies. This will mitigate the significant rise in managerial agency
costs that can be expected to accompany further tightening of the
disclosure rules under Section 13(d).

V. CONCLUSION
Institutional investors in the United States and in the United
Kingdom have come to possess a massive share of equity ownership
and governance rights. As a result, individual investors find

210.
See supra Part I.
211.
Poison pills, staggered boards, and advance notice for shareholder proposal
bylaws are now commonplace in American corporate charters. See Vollmer & Wolfson,
supra note 112, at 5.
212.
See, e.g., Bray, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 16; Katelouzou, supra
note 108, at 462-63; Bebchuk, Bray & Jiang, supra note 172; Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 108.
213.
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 3, at 867 ("[T]he activist
shareholder . .. increase[s] the value of the vote held by the institutions by teeing up
the intervention choices at low cost to the institutional owners.").
214.
See Wong, Stewardship, supra note 1 (discussing obstacles to institutional
investor adoption of a "long-term oriented" attitude toward investing).
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themselves an additional step removed from the companies in which
their money is ultimately invested. Over time, however, institutional
investors have shown themselves to be ineffective corporate monitors
because the role is fundamentally contrary to their nature.
Institutional investors specialize in delivering comparatively superior
investment performance over short periods of time while minimizing
costs and risk.
Institutional investors do not regularly exercise the vast
governance rights that come with huge equity ownership;
institutional investors are rationally reticent. That is, they are
responsive to governance proposals, although not proactive in
introducing them. This sort of "latent activism" presents both the
problem and opportunity of undervalued governance rights and
inflated agency costs.
Activist shareholders, and activist hedge funds in particular,
have come to provide a market-based solution by leveraging the
enormous governance rights possessed by institutional investors,
thereby reducing agency costs. Activist hedge funds have proven
themselves capable of disciplining corporate management and filling
the monitoring gap created by rationally reticent institutional
investors.
Recently proposed amendments to Section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act threaten to hamstring activist hedge funds in filling
this role. These changes appear to be premised on flawed and
outdated perceptions of activist shareholders and the legislative
intent behind the Williams Act.
Enacting amendments to the Williams Act that have a chilling
effect on hedge fund activism is likely to harm individual investors
instead of help them. Current data suggests that concerns over
activist hedge fund short-termism, aggressiveness, and desire for
control are overstated. Activist hedge funds have provided a marketbased solution that institutional investors are not likely to provide.
Regulatory changes impacting shareholder activism should be
minimal, and perhaps follow a "soft law" approach, like those the
United Kingdom introduced in the wake of the global financial crisis
of 2008-2009 through the Stewardship Code. The Stewardship Code
is a set of best practice principles aimed at encouraging institutional
investors to engage in stewardship of their portfolio companies and is
enforced on a "comply or explain" basis. The Code ultimately seeks to
foster the long-term success of companies through active engagement
by institutional investors. Because institutional investors in the
United States lack incentive to engage corporate boards, the Code
overall is ill-fit for the United States. Principle 5, however, may prove
a useful counterbalance to a reduced ownership reporting threshold
or a shortened block-holder disclosure window.
This Note proposes that any amendments to Section 13(d) be
coupled with incorporation of The Stewardship Code's Principle 5 into
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SEC regulations. Principle 5 invites institutional investors to develop
and disclose policies for collective engagement. Activist hedge funds
are often dependent on the support of institutional investors for the
success of their proposals. Access to institutional investors' policies
for collective engagement would empower activist hedge funds to
gauge the likelihood of success of their activist activities at the outset
and formulate their activism strategies accordingly. Ultimately,
activist hedge funds will be enabled to continue to serve their vital
role as governance intermediaries in the market for corporate
governance.
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